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The Bologna Process has clearly had a signiﬁcant contribution to re-shaping the
European higher education landscape during the past decade, through the concerted
efforts of European countries that joined this reform process to build a common
space of education—what became in 2010 the European Higher Education Area
(EHEA). The main objective of the Bologna Process, that of creating a system of
“easily readable and comparable degrees” (i.e. the initially two-cycle, and then the
three-cycle system), has been promoted amongst others as a means to facilitate
intra-European student mobility and as a tool to increase the “international com-
petitiveness of the European higher education system” (Bologna declaration 1999).
The number of international students coming from beyond Europe has been the
main proxy used for measuring Europe’s competitiveness compared to that of other
higher education spaces. In fact, the ideal to increase student mobility—both
internally and from the ‘outside’—has clearly been at the core of the Bologna
Process since the very beginning, actually already from the Sorbonne Declaration
(1998), i.e. one year before the de facto signature of the Bologna Declaration.
Student mobility has been a constant theme in the ensuing Bologna Process
ministerial communiqués—the political declarations of the ministers of education of
Bologna Declaration signatory countries, which set the priorities and areas of joint
action for countries part of this higher education space for usually 2–3 years.
Ministerial communiqués underlined with regularity the need to remove obstacles to
student mobility, to facilitate mobility by integrating mobility windows into the
curricula of study programmes and by creating joint study programmes, amongst
other support measures. Along the same lines, in 2009, in Leuven/Louvain-la-Neuve,
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the ministers put forward the ﬁrst concrete mobility-related mobility objective,
namely that by 2020 “at least 20 % of those graduating in the European Higher
Education Area should have had a study or training period abroad”.
The “20 % by 2020” mobility benchmark—as this is often called in European
higher education jargon—is currently paralleled by another recently-set objective in
the area of student mobility, namely the aim of “balanced mobility”. This is what
the present article focuses on, i.e. the concept of “balanced mobility” in the EHEA,
and more speciﬁcally on its coming into existence as a policy goal, its potential
understandings, its status quo and on necessary actions to reach it. Consequently,
we ﬁrst try to trace and understand the goal of having more balanced mobility
between the Bologna Process countries, and to sketch different ways in which the
concept of “balance” could be interpreted, given that policy references to balanced
mobility leave room for interpretation. Next, we try to provide an answer to the
question Why has balanced mobility become an objective at this particular point in
time? Third, we present recent statistics on student mobility in the EHEA context in
order to show how balanced or imbalanced mobility flows are. Fourth, we try to
outline some possible solutions for correcting different types of imbalances
encountered in the EHEA context. And last, we try to conclude from the ﬁndings of
previous sections what would be reasonable to expect in the EHEA context with
regards to this policy aim.
2 “Balanced Mobility” in the Bologna Process
Context—Some Critical Reflections
2.1 The Origins
The call to support more balanced mobility in the European context was ﬁrst made
in (2007), in the London Communiqué, with education ministers of Bologna
countries urging higher education “institutions to take greater responsibility for
staff and student mobility, more equitably balanced between countries across the
EHEA.” A careful read of the ministers’ call reveals that when the ministers asked
universities to promote more balanced mobility, they had in mind student mobility
within EHEA, i.e. bilateral student flows between EHEA countries.
The intra-EHEA focus of balanced mobility was kept in the ensuing commu-
nique of 2009, which speciﬁes that “Mobility should also lead to a more balanced
flow of incoming and outgoing students across the European Higher Education
Area” (Leuven and Louvain-la-Neuve Communique 2009). The Leuven
Communiqué adds thus an important note: that the aim of balance concerns not
only the bilateral student flows between EHEA countries, but also the relation (or
ratio) between total inflows and outflows of individual countries. Last but not least,
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at the same ministerial conference, the education leaders also tasked the Bologna
Process Follow-Up Group (BFUG)—the operational arm of this reform process—to
look into “how balanced mobility could be achieved within the EHEA”.
The response to the ministers’ question came in (2012), in the Bucharest
Communiqué, which stipulates that EHEA countries should “strive for open higher
education systems and better balanced mobility in the EHEA. If mobility imbal-
ances between EHEA countries are deemed unsustainable by at least one party, we
encourage the countries involved to jointly seek a solution, in line with the EHEA
Mobility Strategy.” Therefore, the Bucharest policy document maintains the focus
on balance within EHEA, but adds an important detail for understanding the
rationale behind this goal, namely that a good solution for correcting imbalances
could be bilateral talks between EHEA countries experiencing these situations.
The EHEA Mobility Strategy—Mobility for better learning (2012)—adopted by
the ministers of education at the same high-level conference in 2012, adds some
essential elements for the discussion and understanding of this policy goal. First, the
strategy extends the scope of balanced mobility to flows between EHEA and
non-EHEA countries, i.e. clariﬁes that balanced mobility is not only an internal
objective, but also an external goal. Second, the ministers clarify that when they
advocate balanced mobility they primarily mean to achieve more balance in degree
mobility, rather than in credit mobility (which is by nature more balanced). Third,
the strategy speciﬁes that imbalances with regards to (too) high international student
inflows were to be particularly tackled: “Efforts made by governments as well as
higher education institutions confronted with high levels of incoming degree and
credit mobility deserve our acknowledgement and attention in order to strengthen
the EHEA.” And fourth, it lists some actions on how imbalances could be
addressed, advancing the possibility of multilateral—instead of bilateral only—
action, as a last resort: “If the ﬁndings show greater imbalances over longer periods
of time, the governments concerned should jointly investigate the causes, consider
carefully the advantages and disadvantages of the speciﬁc imbalance and seek
solutions if deemed necessary. Dealing with the matter multilaterally might also be
considered.”
Therefore to summarize, the Bologna Process policy documents (to date) allow
us to conclude the following with regards to the balanced mobility aim. First, that
balance is an internal (between EHEA countries), but as of 2012 also an external
(between EHEA and non-EHEA countries), objective. Second, that balance is
primarily to be sought in bilateral flows between EHEA countries (e.g. between the
number of students from country X going to study in country Y and the number of
students from country Y coming to study in country X). Third, that nevertheless, at
country level, balance is pursued also between total inflows and outflows (e.g.
between the total number of students going out of and coming into an EHEA
country). And fourth, that particularly imbalances due to high inflows of
degree-seeking students should be addressed.
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2.2 The Caveats
Interestingly, the objective of balanced mobility was set in the EHEA context
without any prior explanation of what is actually understood through balanced
mobility. Or to express this differently, under which conditions mobility flows
would be considered as balanced. Would only situations of perfect equilibrium
between inflows and outflows be regarded as balanced or would small differences
also be acceptable? These issues were not explored in the Bologna Process policy
documents, balanced mobility lacking a proper deﬁnition therein. There are dif-
ferent potential explanations as to why this happened (or has not happened)—for
example the ministers might have thought that the concept of balance was
self-explanatory, or they believed that clarifying the concept would not be a task for
themselves, but of the operational arm of the process—the BFUG.
Nevertheless, irrespective of the motives behind this lack of clarity, there have
been earlier attempts to deﬁne what “balanced mobility” could mean. Applying this
concept of balance to total student inflows and outflows, Teichler et al. proposed in
2011 to deﬁne as balanced a situation where the difference between inflows and
outflows is smaller than 10 percentage points. Therefore, balanced would be not
only cases where there is full equilibrium between the number of incoming and
outgoing students (which is almost impossible to achieve in practice), but also cases
where the differences are considered negligible or non-detrimental. This is the
deﬁnition that we will be working with in the following sections in order to analyse
how balanced or imbalanced EHEA mobility flows are.
Apart from the lack of a proper deﬁnition, another peculiarity of this objective in
the Bologna Process context is that, while the concept of balanced mobility is
pursued here primarily in degree mobility, the idea of reciprocity, of balance, is
actually the cornerstone of another type of mobility, i.e. credit mobility (student
exchanges). Therefore, balance in degree mobility is a borrowed concept.
Reciprocity as such was one of the original aims of the ERASMUS Programme, in
the sense that the programme wanted to break away from up to then traditional
mobility patterns (i.e. East to West and South to North) and to foster also reverse
flows (West to East and North to South). Therefore, even in the context of credit
mobility balance was not meant as full reciprocity, but rather as having flows in
both directions.
Knowing that the concept of balance is speciﬁc to credit mobility, we cannot
help but wonder if it is at all applicable to or pursuable for degree mobility. Or to
express this doubt differently—would governments have the same tools at their
disposal to influence balance in degree mobility as they have in credit mobility? The
short answer to this question is no, they do not.
Earlier studies (Kelo et al. 2006; Teichler et al. 2011) have highlighted the
intrinsic differences between credit and degree mobility, labelling the ﬁrst as a
horizontal and the second as a vertical type of mobility. Credit mobility is hori-
zontal in the sense that students move for study purposes between higher education
systems that are more or less on an equal par. The main aim of credit mobility is
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personal development and having the experience of another type of teaching and
learning (to compare with one’s own). In contrast, degree mobility is seen as
vertical, in the sense that students generally move from one least developed to a
more advanced higher education system, in the hope of getting a better education—
a better degree—or a specialisation that is not available in the home country.
As the main drivers of the two types of mobility are different, so are their main
funding sources. Whereas credit mobility is largely funded via different mobility
programmes (either at the European, national or institutional level), degree mobility
predominantly happens outside ofﬁcial funding schemes (i.e. is self-funded)—
estimates are that at least 90 % of degree mobile students are free movers (Teichler
et al. 2011). As a result, while governments can more easily shape the credit
mobility flows and move towards more balanced exchanges by adjusting the
funding they make available for these purposes, they do not have the same room for
manoeuvre in degree mobility, which is preponderantly self-funded and driven by
individual (career) needs. We will come back to these points in Sect. 4, when we try
to outline potential courses of actions that are necessary to correct imbalances.
3 Why “Balanced Mobility” in 2007?
As presented in the earlier section, balanced mobility was ﬁrst mentioned as a
policy goal in the Bologna Process context in 2007. So what has happened in this
period to explain the adoption of this objective at the supranational level, especially
knowing that imbalances in student flows were not a new development for most
European countries? Just as an example, many countries in Eastern and Southern
Europe had for instance for more than a decade not only experienced, but also
denounced a particular type of imbalance—“brain drain”, i.e. the fact that much
more of their students left to study abroad than students came from abroad into their
higher education systems. This outflow of students to other countries coupled with
often modest inflows was equalled to an export of talent, a situation no particular
country wanted to ﬁnd itself into.
Furthermore, in a recent study of Eurydice (2012), comparing the size of and
differences between the numbers of incoming and outgoing degree-seeking students
in the EHEA countries, the latter are divided into four types of systems, depending
on the kind and magnitude of imbalances they experience. Accordingly, the
“limited” systems are found in countries experiencing high outflows but lower
inflows (those generally denouncing brain drain), the “closed” countries are those
with low outflows and even lower inflows, while the “open” systems are charac-
terised by high outflows but even higher inflows), and ﬁnally the “attractive”, with
low outflows and generally high inflows.
What the Eurydice study also does is clearly show that, while balanced mobility
might seem like a hard-to-challenge objective—as the very notion of balance has an
intrinsic positive value (balance is generally perceived as essentially good, while
imbalance as negative)—there are situations where certain types of imbalances are
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not only seen as positive, but also highly desirable. Just as there are situations in
which balanced mobility is not necessarily positively connoted. And as the authors
showed through their grouping of systems, for a long time in the European context
high student inflows and smaller outflows have been actively pursued as an
objective, whereas situations of low inflows and low outflows for example, while
balanced, have been largely seen as undesirable. While countries with “attractive
systems” (like the UK, France, Denmark, Sweden, Belgium) were seen (despite
their great imbalances) as “the benchmark” in terms of student mobility, countries
with “limited systems”, although showing more balanced flows, were clearly not a
model.
Therefore imbalances were not a new phenomenon in 2007 and certain imbal-
ances in student inflows have not only been tolerated, but actively pursued. So
coming back to our question, why balanced mobility in the Bologna Process in
2007? Because, particularly in the mid-2000s, some of the countries with “attrac-
tive” systems and which enjoyed greater power of influence in the Bologna Process
became to an extent victims of their own success. Several of them started to feel
some negative consequences of too high inflows of foreign students, either in the
form of (hindered) access of their own nationals to higher education in speciﬁc
ﬁelds (e.g. Austria and the French-speaking Community of Belgium) or related to
the cost of education, i.e. questioning the legitimacy of educating foreigners by
using national tax-payers’ money in countries with no or not very high tuition fees
(e.g. Denmark, the Netherlands and Germany more recently).
Two elements speak in favour of this interpretation in particular:
• the focus in the EHEA context on balance in degree mobility, although balance
is a concept speciﬁc to credit mobility, as commented above, and although
imbalances were equally observed in credit mobility (Teichler et al. 2011, p. 92,
Vol. I); and
• the focus on imbalances related to incoming degree mobility, alluding to
countries “confronted with” a high influx of students from abroad, although
imbalances related to outgoing mobility (“brain drain”) had a much longer
history in the Bologna context.
The ﬁrst type of negative consequence—limited access for own nationals—has
been experienced by 2 countries in particular. Austria and the French-speaking
Community of Belgium had been trying to cope for over a decade with a high influx
of foreigners from neighbouring countries Germany and respectively France (with
whom they shared the same language) in a speciﬁc subject area—medical and
paramedical studies—regulated by a numerus clausus condition. As the German
and the French applicants crossing the border and applying in the neighbouring
countries became more numerous, they increasingly prevented the access of
Austrian and Walloon students to this subject area. In 2005 for example, 40 % of
the new entrants in medical studies in Austria were German nationals. To cope with
this situation, the two EU member states decided in 2006 to introduce student
quotas in this subject ﬁeld, i.e. to reserve a number of places for domestic students
and to thus limit the access of foreign (also EU) nationals (Pechar 2014). As of
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2006, 75 % of study places in medicine in Austria and 70 % in Wallonia are
reserved for own nationals.
This move has gotten both Austria and the French-speaking Community of
Belgium in a dispute with two European Union institutions—the European
Commission (EC) and the European Court of Justice (ECJ), for breaching a fun-
damental right in the EU context—the right to free movement (Garben 2012). After
long deliberations, the EC (in 2007) and the ECJ in a preliminary ruling (in 2010)
have concluded that, while imposing quotas for other EU-nationals violates the
right to free movement in the EU framework, such practices could be accepted in
very speciﬁc situations. The countries in question had to demonstrate that their
national systems would be, without imposing such measures, at risk. Therefore,
Austria and the French-speaking Community of Belgium were given a moratorium
until 2016, by which time they have to demonstrate that the foreign medical stu-
dents graduating in their countries leave after graduation, and that as a result the
Austrian and the Walloon healthcare systems will inevitably be confronted with an
undersupply of medical staff.
The second type of negative consequence felt by “attractive” countries had to do
with the cost of educating large cohorts of foreigners and its legitimacy. One of the
countries in this situation was Denmark. For years Denmark had been a net receiver
of degree-seeking students from the other Nordic countries, or, otherwise said, the
other Nordic countries were having big groups of their own nationals educated in
Denmark (at the latter’s expense). To cover for this extra cost for Danish univer-
sities, a compensation system was put in place already in 1996 in the framework of
the Nordic Council of Ministers, under which Denmark would be entitled to a lump
sum for each student it enrolled from another Nordic country (Wächter 2013). The
compensation system was managed through the budget of the Nordic Council of
Ministers, Denmark not having to receive directly any payments.
It must be said though that this type of compensation mechanism, also found for
example in Switzerland between the Swiss cantons, is not designed to redress the
imbalances as such, i.e. is not meant to reduce the gap between inflows and out-
flows, but rather to remedy the ﬁnancial consequences of imbalances and the
burden off the country primarily affected by the imbalances. In other words, the
compensation mechanism is a model of cost-sharing between the countries
involved, but does not automatically lead to more balanced mobility.
National debates about the cost of educating foreigners have taken place in
recent years also in countries like Sweden, the Netherlands and Germany, but have
so far concluded with the ﬁnding that if only a small share of foreign graduates
remain and work in their host country upon graduation then the economic returns
signiﬁcantly outweigh the initial investment in education. Given the strong link
between degree mobility and migration, critical discussions have also taken place in
France and the UK, as to the impact and rights of foreign graduates, but the two
countries have not yet taken any measures to limit the number of international
students.
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4 How Balanced Are EHEA Mobility Flows?
Although we have seen that balanced mobility was very likely advanced as a policy
goal in the Bologna Process by a group of influential countries (part of the
“attractive” systems group and that experienced a speciﬁc type of imbalance), it is
worthwhile to have a look at mobility statistics for the whole group of EHEA
countries, to see how balanced or imbalanced student mobility flows currently are.
Concretely, we will look at the relation (ratio) between
• total inflows and outflows per EHEA country;
• inflows from and outflows to other EHEA countries (intra-EHEA balance); and
• inflows from and outflows to non-EHEA countries.
The analysis is based on data on international degree mobility for the year
2010/11, the most recent year available at the time of writing this article in the
international data collection of the UNESCO Institute for Statistics (UIS). Given the
major effort to collect mobility data from the national level worldwide, inevitably
this dataset presents ﬁgures less recent than those available in individual countries,
but more comparable (thanks to common deﬁnitions used for data collection). We
focus on degree mobility only, given the emphasis on degree mobility whenever
balance is discussed in the Bologna Process context, but also because of the lack of
an EHEA-wide data collection on credit mobility (which makes such an analysis for
credit mobility impossible).1
4.1 Balance Between Total Inflows and Outflows
per Country
Figure 1 presents for each EHEA country and for this higher education space as a
whole the total number of incoming students divided by the total number of out-
going students, i.e. the IN:OUT ratio. Ratios with a value of 1.0, as well as with a
difference of less than 0.10 (equivalent of 10 percentage points) are seen as bal-
anced. Ratios with values higher than 1.1 are imbalanced towards inflows, while
ratios with values smaller than 0.9 show imbalances towards outflows.
It is quite clear from the ﬁgure that only two (highlighted in green) of the 47
EHEA countries actually have balanced mobility flows—Norway and Greece. As
1Hypothetically, we could also imagine applying the concept of balance to bilateral flows between
countries. But given the stark differences between the size of the higher education systems that are
part of EHEA country and given the tradition of certain countries to specialize in certain disci-
plines that are offered to foreigners (e.g. medical and paramedical studies in Hungary, Romania,
etc.) we ﬁnd it hard to believe that this is what the ministers had in mind when adopting the
balance objective. Further on, we could also envisage applying the concept of balance across study
ﬁelds, and levels of study (Bachelor, Master and Ph.D.). However, given the lack of comparable
data at supranational level on these parameters, we could not conduct any such analyses.
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earlier commented though, the table also shows that the vast majority of EHEA
countries (25 in total) are net exporters of students, while EHEA as a whole is
imbalanced towards inflows, receiving almost twice more students than it sends
abroad. This is because some of the main receiver countries of foreign students
amongst EHEA members are also imbalanced towards incoming (15 countries, the
UK—Germany group in the ﬁgure).
Fig. 1 IN:OUT ratios for EHEA countries in 2010/11. *Albania, Andorra, Bosnia and
Herzegovina, the Holy See and Montenegro had no data available for inflows, hence the 0
values in the ﬁgure for the ratios
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The size of imbalances also largely varies between EHEA countries—while for
countries like Germany, Portugal or Liechtenstein the imbalances are not so sig-
niﬁcant, for the UK for instance, the number of incoming students is almost 15
times higher than the number of outgoing students.
4.2 Balance Within EHEA
Figure 2 presents for each EHEA country the number of students coming from other
EHEA countries divided by the number of own students going abroad to other
Fig. 2 IN:OUT ratios for intra-EHEA mobility in 2010/11. *Albania, Andorra, Bosnia and
Herzegovina, the Holy See and Montenegro had no data available for inflows, hence the 0 values
in the ﬁgure for the ratios
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EHEA countries only (the IN:OUT intra-EHEA ratios), given that balanced
mobility was ﬁrst put forward, as seen above, as an objective for mobility within the
EHEA block. Figure 2 shows however that comparatively speaking mobility flows
between the EHEA countries only are more balanced than in the case of total
mobility (i.e. if other countries of origin and destination are taken into account as
well). Six countries (Fig. 2) compared to only two previously (Fig. 1) have balanced
flows, receiving from other EHEA countries about as many degree-seeking students
as they send to the same country grouping. Furthermore, only 10 countries com-
pared to 15 countries previously (Fig. 1) are net importers of degree-seeking stu-
dents from other EHEA countries. In several cases, the size of imbalances has also
signiﬁcantly decreased, e.g. for the UK from 14.6 to 11.74, for Germany from 1.61
to 1.05, etc.
4.3 Balance with Non-EHEA Countries
Figure 3 presents for each EHEA country the number of students coming from
non-EHEA countries divided by the number of own students studying abroad in
non-EHEA countries, because, as mentioned above, the EHEA Mobility Strategy
refers, although much more briefly, to the need to have balanced mobility also with
non-EHEA countries, i.e. countries that are not part of this educational block. In this
respect, data presented in Fig. 3 is particularly revealing. The biggest imbalances
that EHEA countries face are not in the student flows to and from other EHEA
countries (i.e. in internal mobility), but with countries outside this educational
space. Whereas overall the majority of EHEA countries are exporters of
degree-seeking students (Fig. 1), when it comes to the flows between EHEA and
non-EHEA countries, the majority of countries—32—are net importers of students.
This leads us to conclude that in fact the biggest imbalances that EHEA countries
would have to address are not with other EHEA countries, but with non-EHEA
ones. And if EHEA countries continue to outline balanced mobility as a policy goal,
then they should ﬁrst and foremost be ready to correct their imbalances with
non-EHEA countries.
5 More Balanced Flows—What Would This Entail?
Given the balanced mobility policy goal and the magnitude of imbalances presented
in the previous section, an inevitable question is what kind of actions could and
should be taken to reduce the gap between inflows and outflows? And related,
would EHEA countries be likely to take such actions?
As mentioned above, while the Bologna communiqués mention bilateral and
multilateral talks as a means to solve the imbalances, the solutions tried so far—
compensation mechanisms—are not so much a tool to correct the imbalances as
Balanced Mobility Across the Board—A Sensible Objective? 37
such, as they are a means to address the ﬁnancial implications of imbalances.
Therefore, limiting the imbalances would require other types of means.
For countries with imbalances towards inflows (i.e. higher inflows than outflows),
a logical step would be to try to increase the outflows and/or to limit the inflows.
While this seems possible in theory, in practice it is rather unlikely that countries
would be willing to take such actions. Previous research has shown that supporting
higher student outflows in degree mobility is very rarely a policy goal, given that
high outflows are generally associated with brain drain—a situation that no country
wants to willingly experience (Ferencz and Wächter 2012). The only circumstances
Fig. 3 IN:OUT ratios to and from non-EHEA countries in 2010/11. *Albania, Andorra, Bosnia
and Herzegovina, the Holy See and Montenegro had no data available for inflows, hence the 0
values in the ﬁgure for the ratios
38 I. Ferencz
so far in which countries supported outgoing degree mobility were if they had
limited internal capacity in higher education, and it proved cheaper to train their
students abroad than to develop this capacity internally—notable such examples are
Cyprus and Norway. But once countries develop such capacities at home, they are in
general no longer willing to encourage outflows. Limiting the inflows seems also
hard to imagine outside of very speciﬁc situations like those in Austria and the
French-speaking community of Belgium, where high number of incoming students
hinder the access to higher education of domestic students, if not for other reasons
than at least because it would be a violation of EU’s principle of free movement (for
EHEA countries that are also EU member states). Also, as many European countries
start to experience a decline in their university-age population, students from abroad
become an indispensable resource to ensure the survival of many institutions. Not to
mention that in more and more European countries the non-European students in
particular are a very important source of revenue generation.
From countries experiencing imbalances towards outflows, i.e. higher outflows
than inflows, the opposite would be expected, namely taking measures to decrease
the outflows and/or increase the inflows. Again, we are sceptical that this would be
possible via other measures than be restricting the right to free movement in the EU
context, given that generally countries do not massively fund outgoing degree
mobility (so their influence is limited) and that what drives degree mobility is
individual will to get a better education elsewhere. So unless countries impose
restrictions on the right to leave the country for study purposes or they substantially
improve the quality of their higher education system to determine their students to
want to remain “at home” (which is anyhow a long-term process), it’s hard to
imagine that governments alone can lower outflows. Higher inflows on the other
hand are what most countries strive for, but something which is harder to achieve
and which is a long-term process.
And let us not forget that most EHEA countries that have committed themselves
to the goal of balanced mobility do not experience marginal imbalances, but sig-
niﬁcant ones—their discrepancies between inflows and outflows in one direction or
the other being between 100 and 1600 %. Therefore, large-scale actions would be
necessary to remedy the imbalances.
6 Conclusions: Balanced Mobility—A Reasonable
Objective?
In the previous sections we have tried to dissect the objective of balanced mobility
as articulated in the Bologna Process context. Speciﬁcally, we have:
• traced and tried to understand the goal of having more balanced mobility
between the Bologna Process countries,
• looked into what exactly might explain the adoption of balanced mobility as a
policy goal,
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• presented statistics on current imbalances that would have to be addressed, and
• tried to identify necessary courses of action for correcting current imbalances.
In order to answer the question behind this article, namely of whether balanced
mobility is a sensible policy goal, we would like to reiterate some of the main points
we’ve made throughout the article.
First, the aim of having more balanced mobility was pushed through in the
Bologna Process at a time when a group of “attractive” and influential EHEA
countries (from a higher education point of view) were affected by very speciﬁc
types of imbalance related to international student inflows, i.e. very high inflows of
foreign students in speciﬁc ﬁelds of study or the rising costs of educating foreign
students as a result of ever growing numbers. So when balance was adopted as a
Bologna objective, the countries in question had a speciﬁc agenda in mind—the
remedy of this particular type of imbalances (too high or costly inflows), although
most other EHEA countries were experiencing another type of imbalance, namely
too high outflows.
Second, balanced mobility was set ﬁrst and foremost as an internal objective,
although, as shown above, mobility flows between EHEA countries are much more
balanced than flows between EHEA and non-EHEA countries. With the extension
of the balance aim to non-EHEA countries, if EHEA countries want to achieve the
balance objective, then it seems normal that they would ﬁrst focus on the biggest
imbalances, i.e. those with non-EHEA countries.
Third, in the EHEA, balance is sought primarily in degree mobility although it is
a concept originating from credit mobility and though degree mobility is the type of
mobility that is least under the control and influence of governments.
Fourth, although balance is a set objective, in degree mobility some imbalances
have for a long time been regarded as not only positive but also desirable. We ﬁnd it
hard to believe that the general attitude towards this will change. Most countries
aspire to become “attractive” systems (although these are highly imbalanced
towards inflows) and to move away from being “closed” or “limited” systems
(although these have on average much more balanced flows).
And ﬁfth, given the types of imbalances encountered in EHEA countries, con-
certed action would be needed from EHEA countries, namely measures to either
limit inflows and/or increase outflows or to increase inflows and/or lower outflows.
As argued above, we ﬁnd it hard to believe that most countries would be willing or
even able (have the necessary resources) to take such measures.
From all these we conclude that balance across the board is not an achievable,
nor a desirable objective. While measures to correct particularly detrimental
imbalances in bilateral flows seem necessary and advisable, it is hard to make the
case for balance as such.
Open Access This chapter is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution
Noncommercial License, which permits any noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction in
any medium, provided the original author(s) and source are credited.
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